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 Studies regarding the origins and nature of Antonio Oliveira Salazar's New State are
 being published in Portugal at an impressive rate. New sources and methods are
 being employed by Portuguese historians in an attempt to come to grips with a
 dictatorship which lasted forty-eight years and which, although able to change its
 guise, was always reluctant to do so, and was never as successful in transforming
 itself as Francoist Spain. What these recent studies indicate is that both supporters
 and opponents of the New State overestimated its internal cohesion and Salazar's
 room for manoeuvre within the confines set by the various groups which supported
 his rule. In this article a number of recent Portuguese works that shed some light on
 the end of the republican regime, the military dictatorship that followed, and the
 first phase of the New State's existence - until the end of the Second World War -
 are examined, in order to demonstrate the extent to which the creation of the New
 State was a precarious enterprise, and the way in which its development and impact
 were limited by Salazar's limited freedom of action. The Portuguese dictator had to
 make continuous concessions to those who supported his rule in order to remain in
 power, even in the 1930s and 1940s, usually held to be the decades in which the
 New State met with the least domestic and foreign opposition, and was thus able to
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 reflect most accurately Salazar's wishes. The visible result of these concessions was
 the emphasis given by the New State's ideologists to the virtues of stability and
 order, to the detriment of progress, development, and reform.
 The attention given by historians of contemporary Portugal to Salazar's New
 State has one drawback: the unloved First Republic (1910-1926) continues to be
 largely ignored, or is studied merely as a prelude to dictatorship. One recent work
 that attempts to overturn this situation, by reminding us of how much we still have
 to learn about the First Republic, is Manuel Bai?a's Elites pol?ticas em Evora: Da I
 Rep?blica ? ditadura militar. Its simple aim makes it essential reading for those studying
 the First Republic. What Bai?a sets out to accomplish is the identification of the
 political elites in the city of Evora, a district capital in a latifundia area, in order to
 understand their composition, motivations and political aims, as well as the ties that
 bound them. In so doing, Bai?a goes into great detail about the national and local
 elections which took place in 1925 and the reaction of Evora's elites to the military
 coup of May 1926. The appendices to the work read like a Who's who of Evora
 society, which has been subjected to minute examination. All candidates for local or
 national office, holders of administrative positions in the district, military officers
 stationed in the city, and members of professional, economic and commercial
 associations are identified: and to this long cast is given the breath of life, allowing
 the reader to watch closely as the final act of the Republic's existence was played
 out. We are thus in a better position to understand electoral rhetoric and practice, to
 evaluate the damage inflicted locally on political parties by the frequent splits which
 occurred at national level (notably, in 1925, the defection of the left wing of the
 ruling Democratic party under the leadership of former Prime Minister Jos?
 Domingues dos Santos), and even to appreciate the machinations of the Democrats
 which resulted in their retention of one parliamentary deputy in the district, despite
 their clear defeat at the polls.1
 Bai?a's study also reveals the way in which national and local elections differed
 from each other: in the latter contests, faction-fighting was less pronounced and it
 was not uncommon for a leading local figure to appear on more than one electoral
 list. This was largely due to the scant numbers willing to be involved in politics,
 even in a city like Evora which had what in Portuguese terms was a robust and
 diverse political elite. Finally, Bai?a considers reactions to the coup of May 1926,
 which was initially welcomed by all formations, with the exception of the
 Democrats, who at the time controlled parliament, the government and the
 presidency, as well as the leading administrative positions around the country. The
 internal contradictions present in the army's action quickly led to the break-up of
 this consensus, but Bai?a makes it clear that it is impossible to generalise about this
 reaction at a national level without understanding precisely what happened at local
 level ? something which, unfortunately, has often been done. Some parties (notably
 1 A good investigation of the mechanics of election rigging in the First Republic, which were the
 continuation of practices inherited from the constitutional monarchy, can be found in Fernando Farelo
 Lopes, Poder pol?tico e caciquismo na ia Rep?blica Portuguesa (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1993).
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 the Democratic Left) were still favourable in Evora to the military authorities when
 the leadership in Lisbon had begun to cry foul; conversely, the Nationalist party, the
 main conservative opposition group to the right of the Democrats, opposed the
 dictatorship, despite common aims and the fact that post-May 1926 administrative
 positions were filled by men drawn from backgrounds similar to those of the
 Nationalists' local membership. Historians of the First Republic can only hope that
 Bai?a's example is taken up by others, allowing for a better understanding of how
 the First Republic's political parties actually worked - an understanding now more
 firmly grounded in serious and systematic historical analysis.
 Two of the groups mentioned above, the Nationalist party and the army, had
 often come together in the plotting to overthrow the Democratic party and alter the
 course of the Republic. This much is made clear in Aniceto Afonso's Historia de urna
 conspira?ao, which charts the progress of one of the early candidates for dictator,
 General Sinel de Cordes. He is in many ways a crucial figure in Salazar's rise to
 power because, having conspired against the Republic and refused any compromise
 with that regime after the coup of 28 May 1926, he was given the crucial job of
 Finance Minister, and was found badly wanting, compounding a crisis which
 threatened to bankrupt Portugal. It was Sinel de Cordes whom Salazar replaced in
 1928, taking advantage of the country's catastrophic financial situation to impose his
 terms on the military government - an absolute say in the spending of every
 government department - becoming, as the press called him, 0 ditador das Finan?as.
 Having been a deputy under the parliamentary monarchy, Sinel de Cordes was too
 closely identified with monarchist politics to be able to launch an overt challenge
 against the Republic; he therefore seized the opportunity presented by the disarray
 brought on Portugal by the First World War to attack the weakened regime, not as
 a monarchist, but as a nationalist, preoccupied by the future of his country. Afonso
 is able to trace - thanks to a detailed knowledge of the press in the years between
 1919 and 1926 - Sinel's public pronouncements and writings, which, although
 outwardly designed to interest the general public in matters of defence, were
 actually messages to other army officers about how to resolve the country's political
 difficulties. Sinel de Cordes believed that social agitation and economic difficulties
 were simply a result of political disorder; once this had been solved everything else
 would fall into place. He felt that only the army could govern in a 'national' way,
 and correctly assumed that most other officers, the silent majority that was not
 involved in politics, felt the same. He also believed - and this, Afonso claims, was
 what set Sinel de Cordes apart from other conspirators - that the army had to act in
 a united and disciplined fashion, led as one entity by its highest-ranking officers. He
 reached this conclusion after a number of failed plots in which he was involved.
 These included the 'palace coup' in 1923, in which a rare Nationalist government
 attempted to use the excuse of a minor radical rising to force the president to
 dissolve parliament and call fresh elections (which the government, in power, and in
 accordance with traditional Portuguese politics, would win), but which the
 president, Teixeira Gomes, resisted, earning an enmity that would eventually lead to
 his early retirement and exile from Portugal.
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 Afonso relies almost exclusively on the press for his information, and his
 extremely lengthy quotes from Portuguese newspapers can become tiresome, as
 there is a great deal of repetition in the articles analysed. Although the thesis on
 which the work is based was accepted before the author was named director of the
 Army's Historical Archive, it is still interesting to note that these archives are not
 used in the book; neither is an attempt made to gauge, from official sources, how
 much the republican governments knew about each conspiracy and how they
 attempted to defend themselves. Nevertheless he is correct in pointing out the
 difficulty of his task - the chronicling of a conspiracy six years in the making - and
 the need to be thorough when examining the myriad coups and counter-coups that
 shook Lisbon in the seven years that followed the First World War. This confusion,
 and the constant creation and dissolution of political formations in the years
 1919?26, is doubtlessly one of the reasons which makes the period so unattractive
 for researchers, who flock to the more ordered and well-documented New State.
 A third work that covers the period under discussion is Pedro Oliveira's Armindo
 Monteiro. Biographies of even the most important national figures are few and far
 between in Portugal, despite a popular demand made clear by the success of the
 recently published biography of the country's first King, Afonso Henriques.2
 Professional distrust of the biography as a historical tool in Portugal is evident by the
 lack of an academic biography of Salazar, whose market success would be
 guaranteed.3 For that very reason Oliveira's study of Armindo Monteiro is a
 welcome addition. Oliveira draws parallels between the careers of Monteiro and
 Salazar, stressing Monteiro's excellent links with the business world and the high
 profile he enjoyed thanks to multiple professional activities (a lecturing position in
 the new Faculty of Law in Lisbon, positions on the boards of financial institutions, a
 regular column in a leading Lisbon daily, the Diario de Noticias), and pointing out the
 moment when Monteiro, perhaps out of loyalty, failed, through his silence, to
 transform himself into a contender for Finance Minister. Unlike Monteiro, Salazar
 castigated Sinel de Cordes' disastrous tenure of the same post, from the pages of the
 Catholic newspaper Novidades. As we have seen, Salazar demanded an absolute say
 over the nation's finances. Armindo Monteiro, in his academic work, had called for
 the creation of just such control, along with a general strengthening of the state's
 authority and a reduction of parliament's involvement in the country's finances, in
 order to resolve Portugal's difficulties. Although he was quickly brought into the
 government by Salazar, first as director general of the Statistics bureau (which,
 Pedro Oliveira points out, he effectively created), then as Under-Secretary of State
 for Finances, and in 1931 as Colonial Minister, Monteiro always saw himself as the
 equal of Salazar. In a cabinet which Salazar wished to dominate, even before
 becoming Prime Minister, Monteiro's pretensions quickly led to a rivalry between
 the two men. This rivalry would grow during Monteiro's short stay at the Ministry
 2 Diogo Freitas do Amaral, Dom Afonso Henriques (Lisbon: Bertrand, 2000).
 3 The most extensive, but nevertheless unreliable and partial, biography of Salazar, thus remains the
 six-volume Salazar, by Franco Nogueira, the first volume of which was published in 1977. (Franco
 Nogueira, Salazar: A mocidade e os principios (Coimbra: Atl?ntida Editora, 1977-85).
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 of Foreign Affairs (MNE), which saw him responding to the Abyssinian crisis and
 the start of the Spanish Civil War, and hit its peak during the Second World War,
 when Monteiro served in the most sensitive diplomatic position for Portugal ?
 ambassador in London - while Salazar was, in addition to his other duties, Foreign
 Minister.4
 Like many conservative Portuguese, Monteiro was an anglophile who believed
 that, while unsuitable in Portugal, parliamentary democracy was a worthwhile
 regime in an ordered society such as Britain's. Unlike Salazar, moreover, Monteiro
 did not believe that Britain and its empire could be defeated: until the tide of war
 turned the Allies' way, therefore, Monteiro played a dissenting role, urging Salazar
 to remain in the British sphere, and reminding him of the strategic circumstances
 that made Portugal's alliance with Britain vital to Portugal's survival (adding, after
 US entry into the war, that the role so far played by Britain in ensuring Portugal's
 independence would henceforth be in the hands of the United States, set to become
 the dominant Atlantic power). After the Allies seized the initiative in late 1942,
 Monteiro's position was not strengthened, because he became increasingly exasper
 ated by Salazar's approach to negotiations with Britain, notably in relation to the use
 of the Azores by Allied aircraft. Salazar only moved after the lengthiest of
 deliberations, and then only as little as possible. Monteiro urged speed and
 decisiveness while Salazar reminded him of where his loyalty should lie. As Pedro
 Oliveira makes clear, not even Monteiro was sure where his loyalty lay by 1943,
 when he returned to Lisbon: he had taken to apologising to the British Foreign
 Office for Salazar's dilatory tactics, and in his private writings dwelled on the
 inevitability with which dictatorships, however meritorious at first, become
 corrupted and self-serving in the long term.
 By 1943 it had become obvious to all observers that the two men were on a
 collision course. Staff at the MNE were riveted by the telegraphic duel between the
 two heavyweights, amazed that anyone could write to Salazar in such forthright
 terms,5 while Armindo Monteiro was discussed in London and in diplomatic circles
 in Portugal as a possible alternative to Salazar (which, of course, goes a long way
 towards explaining his rapid downfall). It was generally thought that the British
 would prefer to see him in charge of Portugal, and that Salazar, like Franco in Spain,
 would have to leave office as the war against fascism came to an end. This was not
 to be, however; but the readers of Pedro Oliveira's book are left wondering just
 what Monteiro made of his situation. Oliveira argues that there was a political
 motive behind Monteiro's suggestion that Salazar absent himself completely from
 the negotiations with the Allies over the Azores, and he also points out that
 Monteiro, by acting in London as if he had been dismissed by Salazar, who had
 4 For a recent account of the Portuguese government's response to the Second World War during
 the period when Monteiro was in London, see Antonio Telo, Portugal na Segunda Guerra (1941-1943), I
 (Lisbon: Vega, 1991).
 5 The full scale of this debate is not to be found in the Portuguese white book on the Second
 World War, which was doctored so as to perpetuate the myth of Salazar as a far-seeing international
 leader. Dez anos de pol?tica externa 15 vols. (Lisbon, MNE, 1961-1993).
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 done no such thing, intended to do maximum political damage to his hierarchic
 superior; however, he can find no smoking gun regarding Monteiro's ambitions. In
 any case, as he points out, Monteiro would continue to lead a full life upon his
 return to Lisbon, in academic and financial circles alike, and would, when called on
 to do so, reaffirm his support for the regime.
 In his Debaixo defogol Salazar e as for?as armadas, Telmo Faria attempts to illustrate
 the way in which Salazar slowly imposed his will on the Portuguese army. This was
 a crucial development in the affirmation of the New State as a durable civilian entity
 because, of course, Salazar had been recruited by the army following his criticism of
 Sinel de Cordes's performance in the Ministry of Finance. Salazar had been
 promised, at that moment, a tight control over expenditure, but not over the
 political future of the military dictatorship. Gaining the army's approval for a civilian
 regime was a difficult task, but reforming the army as a civilian was even more
 difficult, and required all of Salazar's guile and discipline. In order to carry out these
 twin tasks, Salazar and the New State ideologists enshrined the myth of the coup of
 1926 as the opening move of a 'National Revolution', in which the nation's 'sound'
 elements, spearheaded by the army, had finally acted to put an end to the liberal
 experiment which was driving Portugal headlong into ruin. In other words, Salazar
 flattered the army in order to return Portugal to civilian (or better yet, his) rule. As
 we have seen already, the rhetoric of the 'National Revolution' was far from true,
 but by accepting unquestioningly the army's role as the initiator of a 'national
 movement' Salazar was buying room for manoeuvre. Even after having risen to
 Prime Minister, and after the adoption of the new Constitution in 1933, Salazar had
 to consult the army and act in accordance with its general wishes: Faria's book seeks
 to explain how this situation came to an end.6
 In order to secure power in the 1930s, Salazar had to find a way of imposing his
 political will on the army while retaining its loyalty to the New State. He did this,
 over time, by holding out the lure of a reorganisation and a remodernisation that
 had long been awaited by the army. The Portuguese officer corps was only too well
 aware of its inability to carry out its most basic function: the protection of Portugal
 itself. Faria traces the way in which Salazar gained ascendancy over those who
 sought to preserve military control of the army's life with extreme care, a care
 which matches the way in which Salazar made every move, and which resulted in
 the exasperation of his opponents within the army, eventually driven by sheer
 frustration to make a mistake fatal to their ambitions. Thanks to his undisputed
 stranglehold on the nation's finances, Salazar could delay any reform which involved
 expenditure; he also took advantage of faction fighting within the officer corps and
 the ever-worsening international situation (especially after the Spanish Popular
 Front's electoral victory in February 1936) to wear down any opposition to his own
 6 Jos? Medeiros Ferreira, in his O comportamento pol?tico dos militares: For?as armadas e regimes pol?ticos
 em Portugal no S?culo XX (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1992), touched on the issue of the subordination of
 the armed forces to civilian rule under Salazar, inserting the topic into the wider discussion of civilian
 military relations in Portugal in the twentieth century.
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 plans. Finally, in May 1936, he became War Minister, becoming thus the ultimate
 patron of the army and the sole authority able to initiate any reforms.
 Faria also examines how Salazar was capable of standing up to military rivals, such
 as War Minister Passos e Sousa, who dreamed of a wartime army of 500,000 and a
 Portugal capable of defending itself from any aggression. Salazar had a number of
 devoted young officers, the army's 'technocrats', with no political affiliation, who
 provided him with detailed plans for reorganisation and reform, and who served as a
 foil for the discontent of their colleagues, and he was careful to preserve his
 influence over the president, General ?scar Fragoso Carmona. Whenever pressure
 from his military opponents became serious, Salazar would appeal for Carmona's
 support, threatening to resign: and the aging general, his place in the pantheon of
 the 'National Revolution' assured, came down on the side of 'his' Prime Minister.
 With such support, and finally in the position of War Minister, Salazar unveiled his
 vision of the army, which consisted of a small (and cheap) peacetime force of under
 30,000 men, to be increased in case of war. To create this army, and to equip it
 properly, cuts would have to be made in the number of units and officers. Age
 limits were therefore introduced, as was promotion by merit, and retirement was
 made more attractive to senior officers. These were unpopular measures, but the
 army had no-one left to whom to appeal, especially as senior officers saw their
 salaries substantially increased, and as Salazar was using his new-found powers to
 place loyal officers in control of key units. Telmo Faria's conclusion, as a result of
 his meticulous research, is that Salazar did not believe any Portuguese armed force
 to be capable of defending the national territory, seeing the army only as a vital
 support of the New State. Salazar's long-awaited reform of the army, outwardly
 designed to make it leaner and more efficient, was politically motivated, and in no
 way improved Portugal's ability to defend itself. Salazar chose to rely on diplomacy
 to protect Portugal's territorial integrity. It was only in 1941 that he finally opened
 the purse strings, purchasing some of the equipment that the army, increasingly
 worried by the course of the war, demanded; but even then it was doubtful whether
 Portugal could have resisted an offensive by any of its potential enemies.
 If Telmo Faria is concerned with detailing meticulously Salazar's dealings with
 the army, one of the principal pillars of the New State, then Fernando Rosas, in his
 Salazarismo e fomento econ?mico, has a similar aim, but in relation to the country's
 economic elites. This collection of essays brings together Rosas's writings on the
 subject of the different proposals for economic reform which competed against each
 other within the New State's outwardly complicated decision-making machinery.7
 At the heart of this machinery stood, of course, Salazar; but like Faria, Rosas paints a
 picture of a dictator who had to move extremely slowly, considering any proposal
 for change of any description for as long as possible before making a decision.
 Salazar was constrained by the need to appease certain economic groups on which
 7 One of these essays is available in English. Fernando Rosas, 'Salazar and economic development in
 the 1930s and 1940s: Industrialisation without agrarian reform', in Antonio Costa Pinto, ed., Modern
 Portugal (Palo Alto: SPOSS, 1998), 88-101.
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 he depended for support, notably the southern landowners. This was despite the fact
 that the latifundias of the south had long been identified by Portuguese economic
 commentators as the most important reason for Portugal's economic backwardness.
 Over the course of the (sometimes repetitive) essays, Rosas explains clearly the
 background and make-up of a new class in Portuguese society, the technocratic
 'engineers', who believed that they were destined to be the agents of Portugal's
 transformation into a modern country, and who, believing in the need for a strong
 state after sixteen years of instability under the Republic, flocked to serve Salazar.
 Fernando Rosas breaks these reformers into two basic categories: those he
 describes as 'neophysiocrats', who argued that the transformation of Portugal must
 begin through the modernisation of agriculture, and the industrialists, who believed
 that Portugal could transform itself into a modern industrialised country without
 having first to address agricultural concerns. The first, heirs of an older school of
 thought which traced its roots to Oliveira Martins and which had included, for a
 time, Salazar himself, wanted to resolve the basic contradiction inherent in
 Portugal's land-holding arrangements: in the north were small plots which barely
 ensured the subsistence of their owners, and which had forced hundreds of
 thousands to emigrate to Brazil; in the south were the large and inefficient
 latifundias kept alive by an exploited landless labourer class which had no protection
 from the state against either the whims of employers or of nature. The break-up of
 the southern estates, and their transformation, through irrigation, into large family
 farms, was the neophysiocrats' goal: in social terms, the creation of a prosperous
 farming middle class, secure, grateful to the state, and with money to spend.
 Successful at times, and sufficiently powerful to have their proposed legislation
 accepted, the neophysiocrats always fell at the last hurdle. Implementation of the
 laws they inspired never occurred because Salazar, dependent on the support of the
 southern estate owners, did not allow it. As for the industrialists, theirs was an even
 more difficult task: the sudden industrialisation of the country, even if possible,
 would have untold social consequences which Salazar simply would not tolerate.
 The New State's rhetoric on the intrinsic value of rural life, amply supported by the
 landed interests of the South, made the industrialists' dream an impossibility.
 If Faria makes it clear that Salazar cared little about the mechanics of national
 defence, and more about how the army could best be used to support the regime,
 then Rosas complements this picture by suggesting that the nation's economy (as
 opposed to its finances) was less important to Salazar than, as he put it, making
 Portugal 'live habitually'. Stability and order, to be guarded by the New State, were
 what, seemingly, mattered most to him. In the final essays Rosas illustrates vividly
 the consequences of the official insistence on rural values as the foundation of a
 modest but honourable way of life that was, unfortunately for Portugal, totally at
 odds with the reality of the country. The author examines standards of living in the
 north and south of the country to paint a picture of a misery completely out of step
 with the rest of western Europe (with the exception of post-Civil War Spain) and,
 what is more important, does so through official documentation, thus showing
 beyond any doubt that the regime's rhetoric about the moral and social virtues of an
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 agriculture-led economy was false. People across the countryside starved, or came
 close to starving; almost all their money was spent on food; education was nowhere
 a priority; and the government was aware of it all. This was the reality of the New
 State, and it was not surprising that during the Second World War, as the situation
 worsened, a wave of peasant risings spread across Portugal; in the south, these were
 often influenced by revolutionary political entities, and in the north, they were part
 of a defence of what can be called a 'moral' economy which the state was meant at
 the very least, to guarantee.
 Jo?o Medina's Salazar, Hitler e Franco is another collection of writings (which
 vary greatly in extent) and its name is somewhat misleading, since only the last two
 - very short - essays are dedicated to a comparison of the three dictators. Medina's
 interest in this book is one of political typology: he hopes to classify the nature of
 Salazar's thought and the principles of his regime, using official publications aimed
 at all kinds of audiences to trace how the New State explained itself. Medina
 believes that the traditional right in Portugal was strong enough to contain the more
 progressive forces which sought to rid the country of established privilege. In this
 way fascism, with its radical mass appeal, was never necessary in Portugal. Salazar
 insisted on being obeyed, but was merely the most successful in a long line of
 candidates for purveyor of authoritarian rule. Medina concludes that Salazar
 produced an original form of nationalism, different from its contemporaries in the
 rest of Europe, but one which subjected Portugal to one of the darkest period in its
 history.
 The outcome of Medina's investigations is the highlighting of the medieval
 nature of Salazar's conception of society, with God as the ultimate source of power
 and authority, and with a rigid social structure below, ultimately tied to the land and
 its seasons. The emphasis on rural values reflected Salazar's own social background,
 the village life to which he ostensibly returned whenever he could find time to leave
 Lisbon. This medievalism is surprising, considering Portugal's maritime history and
 its substantial colonial empire ? but Medina's study concentrates on the New State
 the its peak of its authority, in the 1930s and 40s, when there was still no challenge
 to colonialism (although Portugal's colonies were coveted by European rivals) and
 when the regime's ideologists did not have to factor the defence of the colonies into
 their view of the 'essential qualities' of the Portuguese nation. Vast sums were spent
 in a poor country on the restoration of medieval buildings, to the detriment of later
 monuments (and of more pressing matters), in an effort to reawaken interest, and
 pride, in the medieval Portugal of the Reconquista and the virtues which the regime
 chose to associate with that period. For all his worldly power, however, Salazar
 could not make the real world fit in with his vision of an ideal society, and political
 compromises had to be made in order for him to remain in power, as we have
 already seen. Salazar might despise the Revolutionary tradition and its emphasis on
 the rights of the citizen, but his 1933 Constitution still reserved a place for the
 citizen in the election of the president (essential for the continued support of
 General Carmona) and - partly - in the election of the Assembleia Nacional.
 Medina also attempts to trace - in order to further separate Salazar from fascism -
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 international reaction to the Portuguese dictator in the 1930s, his most fruitful
 decade in terms of foreign adulation. One Italian translator of Salazar's words was
 embarrassed by his criticism of the Fascist concept of the totalitarian state, with its
 inherent paganism and its embracing of violence. Such misguided criticism,
 Conrado Zoli explained, was due to the paucity of rigorous information in Lisbon
 concerning Fascism in theory and practice.8 Official uneasiness on both sides was
 clear in the attempt to publish a similar work in Germany in 1938,9 and it was in a
 French volume - Comment on releve un Etat10 - that Salazar's theoretical objections
 to Fascism were presented in their clearest fashion: so clearly, in fact, that the work
 was never published in Portugal.
 That the New State's actual political arrangements were hollow is well known.
 Corporate organisations never developed autonomy from the state, and worked
 essentially as a collection of selfish interests ultimately concerned with stifling any
 competition. The regime's authority rested not on the wholesale allegiance of a
 grateful nation, but rather on the painful memory of the First Republic and,
 increasingly, on the threat of force. This force was initially that of the army, but was
 gradually handed over to the civilian agencies of which the Pol?cia de Vigilancia e
 Defesa do Estado (later Pol?cia Internacional de Defesa do Estado and finally
 Direc?ao G?rai de Seguran?a) was the most feared. Struggling to keep pace with a
 different world after the Second World War, Salazar agreed to change the face of
 the regime, but its repressive nature actually worsened. Medina claims not to know
 whether Salazar ever wondered about the corruption, violence and persecutions
 over which he was presiding. He cannot provide an answer to this question (which
 brings us back to the surprising lack of a biography of Salazar), but settles for the
 thought that Salazar probably accepted these problems as necessary evils ? unpleasant
 side-effects of his greater task of making Portugal 'live habitually' - a task which by
 the 1960s, with the West in turmoil, three different wars to be fought in Africa, and
 mass emigration, was looking increasingly impossible.
 What binds all of these works together - despite major disagreements, especially
 between Rosas and Medina on the classification of Salazarism - is that they make
 apparent the tentative nature and the fragility of all regimes in Portugal, from the
 Republic, at war with itself, with its domestic opponents and, for a time, with the
 world at large, to the New State, even at the pinnacle of its power and authority in
 the 1930s and 40s. Narrow elites - political, economic and cultural - fought fiercely
 to control what little they had, surrounded by a poor, illiterate and politically
 apathetic population, which was concerned essentially with its immediate survival
 while the country fell further and further behind the rest of Europe. That the
 Republic could not satisfy the demands of these elites is clear, as is the failure of the
 military to do so after 1926. Turmoil from 1918 to 1928 set the stage for Salazar's
 8 Antonio Ferro, Salazar: II Portogallo e il suo Capo (Rome: Sindicato Italiano de Arti Grafiche,
 1934), trans. Conrado Zoli.
 9 Portugal - Das werden eines neuen Staates ? Reden und Dokumente (Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt,
 1938).
 10 (Paris: Flammarion, 1937).
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 authoritarian rule, which concentrated its attention on the country's financial life so
 that it might be allowed by the rest of the world to withdraw into itself, enforcing a
 paralysis which reinforced - deliberately - Portugal's backwardness and which left it
 as unprepared to deal with diplomatic, military and economic contingencies as it
 had ever been.
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